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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
TAXATIoN-ExEMPTION FROM TRANSFER TAX-NECESSITY OF
INDEFEASIBLY VESTED INTEREST. - Testator provided that all his
property go to his widow for life with power to use such part of the
principal as might be "necessary for her support." Upon her death,
the remainder was to go to his two children and four grandchildren.
Plaintiff-widow contends that this power to invade enlarges her life
estate to one in fee, and gives her the "indefeasibly vested" interest
in the estate which will entitle her to the transfer tax exemption
allotted by the New York law.' The Court of Appeals disallowed
the exemption. Held: A power to invade the principal as necessary
for support does not enlarge a life estate into one in fee so as to
make it "indefeasibly vested" within the meaning of the statute.
Matter of Brower, 304 N. Y. 661, 107 N. E. 2d 589 (1952).
When the inheritance, transfer, and estate tax laws of New
York were originally enacted, it was the intention of the legislature
to accord special consideration in the way of tax exemption to those
beneficiaries who constituted the immediate family of the decedent.
2
Prior to the 1946 amendment a to the New York Tax Law, in order
to be entitled to this exemption, the amount of the estate transferred
to certain enumerated beneficiaries had to be capable of reasonable
ascertainment on the basis of "known data." 4 The value of an ex-
pectant estate which was contingent only on survivorship 5 or re-
marriage 6 could thus be satisfactorily determined. Similarly, where
the life tenant had a power to invade the corpus, and such power was
limited to some ascertainable standard, such as the support of the
life tenant, the values of the life and remainder interests might be
accurately estimated. 7 This was done by reference to the economic
habits of the life tenant and his life expectancy.8 However, if the
1 "Any tax on the amount of the net estate not in excess of one hundred
fifty thousand dollars . . . shall not be payable with respect to (a) The
amount of the net estate transferred to and indefeasibly vested in a husband
or wife, not exceeding twenty thousand dollars. . . ." N. Y. TAx LAW
§ 249-q (a).
2 See Matter of Stubblefield, 191 Misc. 823, 827-28, 79 N. Y. S. Zd 630, 633
(Surr. Ct. 1948); Matter of Walsh, 189 Misc. 350, 351, 71 N. Y. S. 2d 778,
779-80 (Surr. Ct. 1947).3 Laws of N. Y. 1946, c. 380.,
SMatter of Cregan, 275 N. Y. 337, 9 N. E. 2d 953 (1937); Matter of
Campanari, 188 Misc. 666 68 N. Y. S. 2d 253 (Surr. Ct. 1947); see Matter
of Mancuso, 170 Misc. 298, 300, 10 N. Y. S. 2d 459, 461 (Surr. Ct. 1939)
(N. Y. law prior to 1946 was patterned after the federal statute).
5 Matter of Cregan, supra note 4; see Matter of Weinberger, 194 Misc.
294, 296, 85 N. Y. S. 2d 11, 13 (Surr. Ct. 1948) ; Matter of Stroh, 171 Misc.
681, 682, 13 N. Y. S. 2d 560, 562 (Surr. Ct. 1939).
6 Matter of Keenan, 302 N. Y. 417, 99 N. E. 2d 219 (1951) (reference
may be had to recognized remarriage tables).
7 Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U. S. 151 (1929); Matter of
Birdsall, 176 Misc. 619, 28 N. Y. S. 2d 23 (Surr. Ct. 1941).
8 See Matter of Dowling, 191 Misc. 818, 820, 79 N. Y. S. 2d 557, 558
(Surr. Ct. 1948) ; Matter of Birdsall, supra note 7, at 624, 28 N. Y. S. 2d at 27.
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amount of the estate was not readily ascertainable, no exemption was
allowed. 9 This indefinite criterion of "reasonable certainty" resulted
in a volume of litigation disproportionate to the amount of tax
involved. 10
In an effort to remedy the confusion and to evolve a more defi-
nite rule, the present statute was amended in 1946 to provide for
exemptions in computing the estate tax on transfers to a widow,
husband, or children, only if their interests became indefeasibly vested.
Consequently, an estate which is transferred subject to any limita-
tion or contingency whatsoever is not indefeasibly vested,1 1 and there-
fore is subject to tax.12
A question arises as to whether the right of the life tenant to
invade the corpus enlarges his interest from a life estate to one in fee
so as to make such interest "indefeasibly vested" within the meaning
of -the statute. Two recent Surrogate's Court cases have dealt with
the problem, one involving a life estate coupled with an unrestricted
power to invade the corpus, the other a life estate with a power to
invade the principal at the sole discretion of the beneficiary. In the
first case, an indefeasible interest was held to exist,13 whereas in the
second it was held insufficiently vested to grant the exemption.14
In the instant case, the decedent's widow was given the power
to invade the corpus "as necessary for her support." Even though
willing to admit that this was an unrestricted power, the Tax Com-
mission denied that this was an indefeasibly vested interest under
the statute. The Court of Appeals accepted this view, and held that
9 Matter of Weinberger, supra note 5; Matter of Stroh, supra note 5;
Matter of Bonner, 157 Misc. 810, 285 N. Y. Supp. 283 (Surr. Ct. 1936);
Matter of Chollet, 148 Misc. 782, 266 N. Y. Supp. 415 (Surr. Ct. 1933).
'
0 The tax is only 1%; therefore, an exemption can never exceed $20
to the husband or wife, and $50 to other specified beneficiaries.
"1 Matter of Benson, 275 App. Div. 226, 89 N. Y. S. 2d 589 (4th Dep't
1949); Matter of Van Cott, 194 Misc. 984, 89 N. Y. S. 2d 425 (Surr. Ct.
1949) (both cases involved estates subject to divestment upon remarriage);
Matter of Whiteman, 114 N. Y. S. 2d 633 (Surr. Ct. 1952); Matter of
Leonard, 199 Misc. 138, 100 N. Y. S. 2d 105 (Surr. Ct. 1950), appeal dismissed,
278 App. Div. 668, 103 N. Y. S. 2d 136 (2d Dep't 1951) (remainders were
contingent upon survivorship); Matter of Dowling, supra note 8; Matter of
Faber, 191 Misc. 828, 80 N. Y. S. 2d 380 (Surr. Ct. 1948) (trustees' power
of invasion of principal made remainders defeasible). But cf. Matter of
Walsh, 189 Misc. 350, 71 N. Y. S. 2d 778 (Surr. Ct. 1947) (power to invade
corpus does not prevent the remainder from becoming indefeasibly vested).
12 See N. Y. TAx LAW § 249-q(c) (Supp. 1952). "For the purposes of
paragraphs a and b of this section a transfer shall be deemed indefeasibly
vested in the transferee if (1) the death of the transferee will cause a ter-
mination or failure of the interest transferred to him only it if [sic] occurs
within a period not exceeding six months after the decedent's death . . . and(2) such termination or failure does not in fact, occur."
'3 Matter of Wilken, 197 Misc. 724, 97 N. Y. S. 2d 716 (Surr. Ct. 1948).
14 Matter of Ingraham, 197 Misc. 402, 95 N. Y. S. 2d 183 (Surr. Ct. 1950);
cf. Matter of Britt, 272 App. Div. 426. 71 N. Y. S. 2d 405 (3d Dep't 1947);
Matter of Sonnenburg, 133 Misc. 42, 231 N. Y. Supp. 191 (Surr. Ct. 1928).
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a power to invade the corpus as "necessary for support" does not
enlarge an interest from a life estate to one in fee.15 The interest of
the widow was therefore not "indefeasibly vested," and the exemp-
tion afforded by the Tax Law was inapplicable.
The holding in the present case appears to be limited to a life
estate with a power of invasion as necessary for support. Since the
question was not considered, it may still be argued that a life estate
coupled with a power of invasion containing no such phrase is in-
defeasibly vested within the meaning of the tax statute.'0 It may
well be, however, that the phrase "as necessary for support" was
immaterial to the decision, and that the Court of Appeals based its
holding on the theory that the testamentary disposition of a life es-
tate, in and of itself, is sufficient to warrant a disallowance of the
tax 'exemption.
It would appear from judicial interpretation of this statute that
nothing less than the equivalent of a fee interest would be entitled to
tax exemption. An attempted application of so strict a standard to
each individual member of the family, however, seems inconsonant
with the original intention of the legislature.' 7
TORTS-IMPUTATION OF COMMUNISM NOT SLANDER PER SE.-
Defendant, in the presence of third parties, called plaintiff a com-
munist.' Plaintiff commenced this slander action, without alleging
special damages. Defendant's motion to dismiss was granted. Held:
An imputation of communism is not slander per se.2 The court then
reasoned that, in view of the cold war, it is better "... to allow free
15 See Matter of Close,' 281 App. Div. 147, 118 N. Y. S. 2d 284 (3d Dep't
1952).
16 It is therefore unnecessary to conclude either that Matter of Wilken,
supra note 13, is overruled, or that Matter of Ingrahain, supra note 14, is
approved.
17 See Matter of Weinberger, 194 Misc. 294, 297, 85 N. Y. S. 2d 11, 14
(Surr. Ct. 1948) (each transferee must qualify separately for the exemption,
not as a group) ; Matter of Stubblefield, 191 Misc. 823, 827-28, 79 N. Y. S.
3d 630, 633 (Surr. Ct. 1948) ; Matter of Walsh, 189 Misc. 350, 351, 71 N. Y. S.
2d 778, 779-80 (Surr. Ct. 1947).
1 The other defamatory statements were: "The whole neighborhood knows
that you and your husband (meaning Mary Keefe and David Keefe) are
communists." "Some investigator came to my house recently and I gave him
the whole story about your being communists."
2 The court recognized the established rule that an imputation of com-
munism, when written, would be libel per se, but adhered to the ancient dis-
tinction between libel and slander, citing with approval Ostrowe v. Lee, 256
N. Y. 36, 175 N. E. 505 (1931).
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